The increasing concentration and turbulent financial environment of the U.S. airline industry raise serious questions regarding the efficacy of airline ,deregulation. The deregulatory experience has brought into question many of the critical assumptions of entry freedom and contestable markets upon which much of deregulation was based. The current environment poses the important question: How does a smaller or new carrier compete with today's increasingly global megacarriers? The evolution of America West Airlines in its struggle to build a strong market niche provides an interesting case study of one start-up carrier's strategies and policies.
INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the airline industry has und'ergone immense structural change. The original goal of air deregulation. as emphasized by deregulation's sponsors, was to make air travel more accessible to the average consumer by opening entry to the air passenger industry. However, rather than the highly competitive industry characterized by a large number of carriers offering a wide range of price/service options envisioned by deregulation's architects. the airline industry has evolved into a highly concentrated industry dominated by a few industry 'giants. Indeed. the top five airlines controlled 74% of the market and the top ten carriers provided 94% of domestic revenue passenger miles (RPMs) in 1988 (Secretary's Task Force. 1990. p.6) . In addition. a number of U.S. carries such as TWA. Continental. Midway. and Pan Am are in an increasingly troubled financial condition. This high level of concentration coupled with an unstable environment has caused some industry observers to predict a 11raumatic period ll in the 1990s characterized by another round of discounting and bankruptcies for the industry (IIAirline Shakeout On Way.1I 1990. p. 1). Indeed, Eastern Airlines continues to operate under Chapter 11 protection. Such a turbulent environment poses a serious competitive dilemma for both existing smaller carriers and future entrants.
The objective of this case is, therefore, to investigate an increasingly important question: How does a smaller airline survive and grow in a highly concentrated industry dominated by a few major carriers? By briefly discussing the evolution of today's airline industry along with developing a case history of one of the more successful of the upstart carriers--America West Airlines-insight into the issue of competitive strategy in the airline industry can be gained.
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
Government control of the airline industry began with the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. During the next four decades, the Civil Aeronautic Board (CAB) performed a dual role of promoting and regulating air travel. Functioning in its primary role of economic regulator, the CAB exercised control over the airline industry in three areas: entry and exit; rates and earnings; and service. Not until Kennedy's transportation message of 1962 was this principal role of the CAB seriously questioned. In this address Kennedy called for lithe removal of excessive and cumbersome regulatory supervision ..
. and greater reliance on the forces of competition ... II (Sampson, Farris, & Shrock, 1985, p. 453) . By early 1970 the inefficiencies and inequities of the regulatory environment led to a call for deregulation. Indeed, under regulatory control of entry and fares, the airline industry performed as an imperfect cartel, producing supracompetitive rents for airline employees, while providing only marginal returns for the airlines. At the same time, the price and service options available to the consumer were extremely limited, effectively restricting air travel to business travelers, the more affluent, and those who traveled in emergencies. Nevertheless, given the long experience of extensive economic control, the decision to deregulate the airline industry represented a significant change in regulatory philosophy. Many viewed airline deregulation as an experiment--an experiment that led many leading economists to predict either great success or dismal failure.
The success or failure of this great experiment of airline deregulation hinged on whether competition could effectively replace regulation as a control 27 2 Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] , Art. 8 https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol1/iss2/8 DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1990.1018 over the industry; the very purpose of deregulation was to allow competitive market forces to take the place of the federal government in deciding the quality, variety, and price of domestic air service. Unfortunately, the theoretical assumptions of perfect competition, especially the requirement of a large number of sellers, have never matched the airline industry. Contestability theory was therefore promoted by the advocates of deregulation. Under the theory of contestable markets, potential entry of non-participating airlines is substituted for the existence of "a large number of sellers." For potential entry to effectively prevent existing monopoly carriers from charging higher than competitive fares, two basic conditions had to exist: first, no barriers to entry or exit could exist, and second, no economies of scale could be present. If either of these conditions failed to hold, an effective strategy of "hit-and-run" competition could not be carried out by new entrant airlines. However, the CAB ultimately determined that these conditions existed in the airline industry:
"There are no structural traits inherent in domestic air transportation which indicate superior performance by large-size firms; nor are there traits which would significantly inhibit the entry of new firms into the industryU (Brenner, 1988, p. 280) .
The experience of two small, specialized intrastate carriers in California (PSA) and Texas (Southwest), seemed to confirm the CAB's finding and provided practical evidence that new entrants could compete successfully with existing airlines. Neither of these carriers was subject to CAB control and both entered as low-cost airlines attempting to exploit specific market opportunities that had been neglected by trunk carriers. Taking advantage of their lower cost structures, these new entrants offered fares consistently lower than those of their larger competitors. In both cases, the result was rapid market growth and an increase in competition in the city-pair markets where these new entrants participated. These ureal-life" competitive experiences provided the necessary impetus. for deregulation.
THE DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT
In the initial stages of deregulation, the airline industry performed very much as the deregulators predicted it would, with a large number of both small and large carriers entering the industry. A number of these airlines, most 28 3 (Deregulation, 1985) . To become competitive in the long run, however, the major airlines would need to improve prOductivity, bringing their inflated costs into line with those of the low-cost carriers.
Other notable changes in the performance of the industry during the first 6 years of deregulation were an increase in the number of markets receiving nonstop service, an increase in flight frequency during peak times increased, and an increase in convenience, as measured by the ability to complete a flight on the same plane or the same airline, increased substantially. Further, the entrance of low-cost airlines led to the development of a wide array of "no frills" Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] (Dempsey, 1987, p. 542) .
Second, for an airline to successfully enter a new market, it not only must presumably offer some differential advantage to potential passengers, it must also communicate that advantage to consumers. A vast amount of information concerning fares, routes, schedules, and service must be disseminated in this communication process. And in today's television-dominated society, making .this information visible can be extremely expensive. For a new airline to attempt a contested entry into a hub dominated by a major airline, the task of establishing credibility as a viable carrier represents a formidable barrier since the new entrant would have no name recognition or proven track record.
Third, the major airlines have actively sought to develop economies of scope, density, and information through the development of hub-and-spoke structures and through an increase in merger activity. Hub-and-spoke route systems have several advantages over point-to-point service: an increase in the number of city-pairs that can be served efficiently by an airline, a reduction in dependency on other airline for interlining, an improvement in schedule frequency during peak hours, a higher retention rate of passenger on-line, the development of traffic feed through the hub, and the more efficient use of aircraft and personnel. Similarly, as pointed out by William Jordan ., the primary benefit of recent merger activity (25 carriers were involved in 15 different 30 5
Truitt and Fawcett: Emerging as a Major Carrier: A Case Study of America West Airline mergers in 1986) is. II • • • the market power it achieves from a route network that serves many points. thereby providing single-carrier service to an increased number of passengers" (Jordan. 1988. p. 26) . The end result is that when an established carrier develops and takes advantage of these economies, it removes almost any service incentive a passenger may have to fly an upstart rival airline.
Fourth. the incumbent airlines have shown a particular adeptness at imposing switching costs throughout the distribution system. Through the implementation of frequent flyer programs for individuals. progressive commissions for travel agents. and corporate discounts for large businesses, the incumbents have greatly reduced the willingness and ability of consumers to switch carriers. In addition. the development and propagation of computer reservation systems (eRSs) by the major airlines has significantly increased their ability to influence travel agents and to monitor both the behavior of travel agents and of rival airlines using their systems.
Fifth. the majors have implemented successful yield management programs. which allow them to selectively match or beat the low fares offered by lower-cost rivals. Using computers to track travel patterns. the incumbents are better able to manage their inventory of seats. Discounts are offered only on those seats that would otherwise go empty. and even then the deepest discounts are restricted by advance purchase requirements. weekend travel. and other limitations. In effect. the airlines are using GRSs to supply information needed to successfully apply contribution or marginal-cost pricing to excess capacity. This selective approach to price matching creates the perception that incumbent airlines are price competitive with low-fare operators, effectively nullifying their low-cost advantage.
Sixth. a mo~e recent development that has caused some alarm among public policy makers is the international marketing and financial alliances being formed between major U.S. carriers and a growing number of European airlines. The marketing alliances permit each partner to expand their route network and to act as feeders to one another.
Of even greater concern is the trend of foreign flag carriers buying stakes in U.S. airlines. For example, Scandinavian Airlines System owns 9.9% 31 6
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] KLM Royal Dutch Airlines participated as a major partner in the group that purchased Northwest Orient Airlines ("Europe's Interest ... , II 1989) . Although current law limits foreign ownership of U.S. carriers to 25%, the growth of such international financial alliances has serious competitive implications that concern industry analysts and government policymakers. The inability to obtain financing for a proposed buyout of United Airlines by a partnership in 1989 has been attributed in part to comments by Secretary of Transportation Skinner.
Skinner suggested that DOT was concerned because of the level of participation of British Airways in the partnership. Indeed, as America West's profitability returned, so did its aggressive growth. Despite America West's turnaround, many challenges remain to be managed before the airline's successful future will be assured. First, America
West's financial position appears to be precarious, given the turmoil the airline industry is expected to pass through in the next several years. In its year-end 1988 financial statements, America West listed debt exceeding $500 million, with equity of $87 million--a debt ratio exceeding 5 to 1. Interest expense on this debt was more than $43 million, and net working capital was recorded a negative $18.8 million at the end of 1989 (America West Airline Annual Report, 1989) . This financial position troubles many observers who suggest that America West may have overextended itself as it did in 1987 and that it has no reserve of cash to meet unexpected downturns or to take advantage of new opportunities. Second, in 1985, Southwest initiated a significant expansion of service at Sky Harbor Airport. Because the two carriers compete head to head on many routes, Southwest's consistently very low fares (as low as $24.00) in the overlapping markets has led to a IIsky war ll with the carriers matching each other's low fares and targeting negative advertising at the other's service.
Southwest has proven to be a IIthorn in America West's sidell and this rivalry is expected to continue into the foreseeable future.
Finally, the airline industry remains in a very dynamic state of transition with legislation that could conceivably change the nature of industry competition 34 9
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constantly pending before Congress. While some of the suggested changes, such as the possibility that the dominant carriers will be forced to divest their CRSs might be favorable to America West, several others would pose substantial challenges to the airline's future competitive position. Perhaps the greatest of these is the suggestion that foreign airlines be allowed greater access to the U.S. market. America West's history of rapid growth, its current competitive position, and its competitive strategies will now be developed.
BUILDING A COMPETITIVE NATIONAL ROUTE STRUCTURE
America West initiated service as a IIniche" carrier, defining its market as 'west of the Mississippi River" and its primary hub in Phoenix (America West Airline Annual Report, 1984, p. 4) . The carrier chose Phoenix as its hub for several reasons including the year-round good weather, a strong base of conventions and tourism, the proximity to California, and a perceived lack of competition. In fact, as an airline consultant, Beauvais had previously suggested to a major carrier that it establish a hub in Phoenix for these same reasons.
America West's original route structure included regional service from July 1988 that America West would reintroduce service to Kansas City. By
year-end the airline had returned to its growth strategy, albeit at a slower pace. These two factors, combined with the trend toward a more global economy, could have provided an opportunity for America West to channel its growth.
Securing the DOT's approval to serve transpacific markets would have been a big boost to America West's future position in the industry. However, the Australian routes were ultimately awarded to American Airlines, primarily because of American's extensive domestic route system. America West has contested the awarding of the routes to American, but their prospects for obtaining routes to Australia appear dim, at least in the near term ("Australia Air Route Appealed, 1989:E10).
America West also lost in its initial bid to expand in the Pacific Basin The carrier's most recent route map is illustrated in Figure 1 . Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] While striving to provide a high level of convenient service, America West has consistently emphasized its ability to offer low fares. Even so, the airline has sought to avoid the image of a discount carrier. Initially, all passengers paid the same low fare. This one-low-fare approach allowed America West to take advantage of its low cost structure to compete with its higher cost rivals which had suffered through three years of enormous losses. Over time, America West has adopted the industry standard of charging passengers a range of fares, depending upon load factors and restrictions. Although America
West still presents itself as a low-fare airline, the company's differential pricing strategy disqualifies it from true discount-fare status. For example, in the summer of 1988, America West's one-way fare to Los Angeles from Phoenix could cost as much as $64, while its lowest restricted fare was $29. Thus, although America West frequently offers lower fares than many of its rivals, it follows a policy of yield management which entails charging what the market will bear for unrestricted travel (business or emergency passengers) while offering discounted fares to fill seats that would otherwise remain empty.
As is typical in the airline industry, the majority (60-700/0) of America
West's sales are generated through travel agencies. The airline subscribes to all of the major computer reservations systems utilized by travel agents,
including American's SABRE and United's APPOLO. America West pays fees both for being listed on each CRS and for each ticket sold through the CRS vendors. This distribution disadvantage forces America West to provide high levels of customer service to travel agents. To do this, the airline employs a sales force charged with the responsibility of building relationships with travel agents. Also, in the tradition of America West's More Care service, America
West has established a travel agency desk staffed with desk agents specifically trained to answer questions or solve problems for travel agents.
To supplement distribution through travel agents, America West has developed an aggressive direct marketing effort. America West's main reservations center is located at its corporate headquarters in Tempe, Arizona. Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] (Coleman, 1988) .
MAKING THE MOST OF HUMAN RESOURCE
Perhaps one of the most remarkable factors contributing to the carrier's growth is its employees. Chairman Ed Beauvais takes pride in the high levels of performance of America West's extremely loyal employees, and he takes advantage of giving them credit at every opportunity. To Beauvais, effective leadership is the ability to bring out the best in people in order to accomplish organizational goals (Beauvais, 1990) . Under Beauvais' leadership, America
West enjoys one of the lowest cost structures in the industry. This low cost structure is achieved primarily through America West's labor strategy, which is founded on the cross-utilization of a non-union, low-cost, but highly motivated work force.
Compared to the overall industry, America West's labor force is very productive. This high productivity is a result of a compensation package that management believes promotes unity, leading to high levels of employee motivation. When hired by the airline, each employee is required to purchase America West stock equivalent to 20% of his/her first year's base salary.
Management believes that employee ownership is the key which leads to a feeling of partnership and a desire among employees to make America West succeed. This ownership status of the employees is highly touted by America Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] categorizes most of its operational employees as cross-utilized customer service representatives (CSRs). According to federal labor statutes, only employees who spend a preponderance of their time performing a specific task (in this case, functioning as flight attendants) are allowed to vote in an election for union representation (IlUnion Vote Fails ... , II 1989) . America West's pilots also voted to remain independent ("Pilot Group Loses ... , II 1989) .
Throughout the unionization debate, America West waged a serious antiunion campaign, appealing to employee emotions with the argument that unionization would destroy the airline's dream of becoming a major carrier and claiming that unionization would ruin the company's close-knit family relationship. Many of the airline's employees expressed concern that unionization would force America West into bankruptcy. In a 1989 report to employees, management noted that both the AFA and ALPA were defeated by the largest margins in their respective histories. However, the unionization issue remains alive after a January 1990, ruling by the National Mediation Board which nullified the earlier vote to reject organization of the flight attendants by the AFA on procedural grounds (IIAmerica West Will Appeal ... ," 1990).
Although America West has managed to maintain a union-free environment so far, the threat of unionization has forced changes. Originally, America West's cross-utilization plan was envisioned as a vehicle to improve flexibility, productivity, and employee morale by requiring all CSRs to perform several jobs in addition to serving as flight attendants. These tasks included baggage handling, working ticket counters, and answering telephones in the company's reservations center. After the first attempt at union organization in 1986, management allowed CSRs the opportunity to submit bids for particular jobs and schedules, based on seniority. Since that time, true cross-utilization of employees has diminished as employees with the most seniority bid for the most sought-after jobs, while those with the lowest seniority perform the less desired tasks. The efforts by the AFA and ALPA to organize have also forced America West to pay more competitive wages.
ADOPTING AN EFFICIENT APPROACH TO OPERATIONS
Given America West's initial route structure consisting primarily of short- decision to purchase fuel efficient aircraft was made. Boeing's 737 was determined to provide the best fit for American West's early needs. According to a recent cost study, which measured aircraft productivity in terms of the number of seat-miles flown per gallon of jet fuel consumed, this operating decision proved to be appropriate. The study (Nakano, 1988) concluded that America West's fleet was the most fuel-efficient of all major airlines in the United
States (see Table 1 ). Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 [1990] Lehman Hutton analyst Helen Becker agrees that operating its own maintenance facility is a good idea, indicating that the maintenance facility is one of the major reasons to own the stock. Ms. Becker predicts that America
West's revenue from non-passenger contract operations will prove to be an excellent investment for the future given the shortage of world-wide maintenance capacity due to the rapid expansion of the industry and the aging of the world's fleet ("America West in a Highflying Sector, ... ,11 1989, p. C6).
The new technical center repr~sents the first phase of a massive building program planned by America West. The second phase has already begun with the construction of the floor for a second, larger hangar. The final phase is a much needed million-square-foot headquarters building at Sky Harbor Airport.
construction will begin in 1991 to coincide with the completion of Sky Harbor's new Terminal IV. As a result of rapid expansion, America West's employees are currently scattered among 17 different buildings in the Phoenix area. In 9rder to solve the administrative and logistics problems associated with operating out of so many locations, America West has asked the City of Phoenix to build a new corporate headquarters and lease it to the airline. In addition, the carrier has requested the city to build and lease to America West a seco,nd maintenance facility. Although negotiations continue, it appears that Phoenix will assist the airline in its growth.
America West's ability to keep its planes in the air has also helped the airline maintain high levels of efficiency and thus a low cost structure.
According The Nite Flight program has also provided America West an opportunity to enter the air-cargo market. Using Las Vegas as a hub, the carrier has .established a significant cargo traffic with cargo facilities in Phoenix, Los
Angeles, and Oakland. Because cargo is moved primarily at night in order to achieve next day delivery and because it moves in excess cargo space, America West is able to use its Nite Flight program to provide airfreight service at almost no additional cost to the airline. Further, by using freight forwarders to perform ground pickup and delivery service, America West is able to focus 9n what it does best--providing air service. Thus, the revenues from the Cargo Division are very attractive. Cargo revenues of more than $28 million were generated in 1989, an increase of 69% over the $17 million recorded in 1988, and an increase of 223% over the $8.8 million in cargo revenues for 1987 (America West Airline Annual Report, 1989, p. 8) . America West's airfreight service has proven attractive to both businesses and individuals since it offers express counter-to-counter service as well as door-to-door service. For example, Dewey Brown, Jr., of Air Cargo Transit, notes that he uses America
West's cargo services whenever possible because it offers more professional service than its competitors with better rates available. Clearly, America West has been successfut in attracting a growing amount of air freight.
SUMMARY
At the outset, the question of how a relatively small carrier can survive and grow in an increasingly concentrating oligopoly was posed. Today's airline industry is far different than deregulation's sponsors had envisioned. There have been numerous airline failures, and several other carriers are in serious financial difficulty. Given the competitive composition of the industry, America
West's record of phenomenal growth and its proven ability to penetrate its existing markets as well as successfully expand into new markets is trUly a Cinderella story. The carrier's primary strategy to become one of the major players in the U.S. airline industry can be summed up in two words: aggressive growth. The airline is anxious to attempt similar growth in the international 47 22
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